Abstract: In this paper, a class of bimatrix games having the same Nash equilibria of a given game, either in pure or in mixed policies, is characterized. Such a goal is reached by computing the set of all the polynomials that are monotone strictly increasing in a given interval and by borrowing techniques from algebraic geometry to find solutions to a set of polynomial equalities.
INTRODUCTION
Noncooperative game theory deals with the problem of determining the best strategy for multiple decision makers (usually called players) in a way such that each agent pursues his own objective that can be possibly conflicting with the others (Myerson, 1991) . Such a framework has attracted recent interest for economic aspects such as electronic commerce (Guttman et al., 1998) , selfish routing in networks (Roughgarden, 2005) , and algorithmic mechanism design (Nisan and Ronen, 1999) . The concept of solution in such a scenario, in which multiple objectives are minimized at the same time, is not intuitive. Among the first proposed concept of solution (Borel, 1921; von Neumann, 1928; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) , the so called Nash equilibrium (Cournot and Fisher, 1897) , is one of the most ubiquitous in the game theory literature.
In this paper, we consider the class of two-players games in which the set of actions (usually called pure strategies) of each player is finite, usually known as bimatrix games (Lemke and Howson, 1964; Mangasarian, 1964) . A mixed strategy for such games is a collection of non-negative numbers, which have unit sum and are in one to one correspondence with pure strategies, with the understanding that each of this number corresponds to the probability that the player uses the corresponding action (Aumann and Hart, 1992) . In Nash (1951) , it is proved that every finite game has an equilibrium point in mixed policies, while in Mangasarian and Stone (1964) , it is shown that, for such games, a point is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a solution of a single programming problem with linear constraints and a quadratic objective function that has a global maximum of zero.
The problem of finding any Nash equilibrium, even for games involving only two players, has been recently proved to be complete in the PPAD (polynomial parity argument, directed version) class (Mehta, 2014; Papadimitriou, This work is partially supported by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Office of Naval Research under MURI grant No. N00014-16-1-2710 . 1992 ). This fact has leaded to the definition of ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile such that no deviating player could achieve a cost lower than the nominal one minus ε (Spirakis, 2015) . In Chen et al. (2006) , it is shown that, if ε is smaller than a given constant, dependent on the dimension of the game, the problem of computing an ε-Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is still PPADcomplete. However, by allowing higher values for the constant ε, it can be shown that an ε-Nash can be computed in polynomial time (Kontogiannis et al., 2006) . Due to the high computational complexity of the available algorithms to obtain Nash equilibria, it seems of interest to deal with an inverse problem, i.e., to fix a bimatrix game, whose Nash equilibria are known, and to compute a set of bimatrix games that admit the same Nash equilibria. Such a goal is pursued here, considering strategically equivalent games (Başar and Olsder, 1999) . This objective is reached by characterizing the set of all the polynomials that are monotone strictly increasing in a given interval and by solving, through computational algebraic geometry, a set of equalities involving these polynomials. It is worth to remark that similar techniques have been used in Sassano (2015, 2016) to characterize the Nash equilibria of linear and nonlinear dynamical games.
BIMATRIX GAMES
Consider a two-player game G in which two players P 1 and P 2 are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ 1 and Γ 2 (Hespanha, 2016) . Letting γ ∈ Γ 1 , σ ∈ Γ 2 be the actions of the two players, the task of player P i , i = 1, 2, is to minimize the cost function G i : Γ 1 × Γ 2 → R, without caring of the cost function of the other player. Note that, however, the two cost functions may be conflicting, leading to a competitive game.
A pair of policies (γ , σ ), with γ ∈ Γ 1 and σ ∈ Γ 2 is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if
A pure bimatrix game is a game where the action spaces of the two players are finite, i.e., Γ 1 = {1, . . . , m} and Γ 2 = {1, . . . , n}, m, n ∈ Z, m 1, n 1. The outcomes for the two players can be identified, in such games, by two matrices
where a G ij (respectively, b G ij ) denotes the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix A G (respectively, B G ). With such an encoding, the actions of players can be identified as P 1 selects a row of the matrices A G and B G , P 2 selects a column of the matrices A G and B G .
Bimatrix games also admit mixed policies, in the sense that P 1 (respectively, P 2 ) chooses a probability distribution on the selection of the rows (respectively, columns) of the matrices A G and B G . In this framework, a mixed policy for P 1 is a m-tuple (y 1 , . . . , y m ) such that y i 0, i = 1, . . . , m, and m i=1 y i = 1, where y i is the probability that P 1 uses the action i, i = 1, . . . , m. The set of all the mixed policies for P 1 is denoted Y. On the other hand, a mixed policy for P 2 is a n-tuple (z 1 , . . . , z n ) such that z j 0, j = 1, . . . , n, and n j=1 z j = 1, where z j is the probability that player P 2 uses the action j, j = 1, . . . , n. The set of all the mixed policies for P 2 is denoted Z. When dealing with mixed policies, a pair of policies (y , z ), with y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z is a mixed Nash equilibrium if
In Nash (1951) , it is proved that every bimatrix game has at least one mixed Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in Mangasarian (1964) , it is shown that (y , z ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a solution to minimize
(1) where˙ denotes the entry wise inequality , and 1 denotes a vector of ones. Additionally, the minimum of the cost function in the problem given in (1) is exactly zero.
Consider two generic games G and H, with the same actions spaces Γ 1 and Γ 2 , and such that:
• G 1 (γ, σ) and G 2 (γ, σ) are the outcomes in the game G for player P 1 and P 2 , respectively.
• H 1 (γ, σ) and H 2 (γ, σ) are the outcomes in the game H for player P 1 and P 2 , respectively.
The games G and H are weakly strategically equivalent if there exists two monotone strictly increasing scalar functions φ and ψ such that,
By Lemma 9.1 of Hespanha (2016), if G and H are strategically equivalent, they have the same Nash equilibria in pure policies. If, in addition, the games G and H admit the same Nash equilibria in mixed policies, then G and H are said to be strongly strategically equivalent. The following theorem characterizes weak and strong strategic equivalence for bimatrix games. Theorem 1. Let G be a bimatrix game identified by matrices A G , B G ∈ R m×n and let H be a bimatrix game identified by matrices A H , B H . i) If there exist monotonically strictly increasing functions φ, ψ such that for i = 1, . . . , m, j = . . . , n, a
then G and H are weakly strategically equivalent. ii) If, in addition, the functions φ and ψ are affine, G and H are strongly strategically equivalent.
One of the main objectives of this paper is formalized in the following problem. Problem 1. Let a bimatrix game G, identified by matrices A G and B G be given.
(1) Find a family of games F m (G) such that every gamē G ∈ F m (G) is strongly strategically equivalent to G.
(2) Find a family of games F p (G) such that every gamē G ∈ F p (G) is weakly strategically equivalent to G.
If one is able to solve Problem 1(1), one obtains a set of games that, by Theorem 1.ii), have the same Nash equilibria of G in mixed policies. On the other hand if one is able to solve Problem 1(2), one obtains a set of games that, by Theorem 1.i) and Lemma 9.1 of Hespanha (2016) , have the same Nash equilibria of G in pure policies. This feature is practically desirable in the process of designing of bimatrix game, because, by computing such families, one can design games with desired Nash equilibria, either in pure or in mixed policies, by computing the Nash equilibria of a single bimatrix game. Note that the families F m (G) and F p (G) are nonempty, because they contain G.
Hence, by letting G be a game having Nash equilibria (y l , z l ), l = 1, . . . , L, by solving Problem 1(1), we can compute a family of games that have (y l , z l ), l = 1, . . . , L, as Nash equilibria in mixed policies. On the other hand, by letting A and B be two matrices such that there exist pairs of indexes (i l , j l ), l = 1, . . . , L, such that a i l j l a i,j l and b i l j l b i l ,j , for all i, j, then, by solving Problem 1(2), we can compute a family of games that have (i l , j l ), l = 1, . . . , L, as Nash equilibria in pure policies. Example 1. Consider the bimatrix game G defined by
By solving the problem given in (1), one has that {(1/2, 1/2), (1, 0), (0, 1)} is the set of all the Nash equilibria in mixed policies of game G. On the other hand, it can be easily checked that {(1, 1), (2, 2)} is the set of all the Nash equilibria of game H in pure policies.
Hence, by solving Problem 1(1) with respect to G, one can obtain a family of games that have (1/2, 1/2), (1, 0), (0, 1) as Nash equilibria in mixed policies, without actually computing the Nash equilibria of these games. On the other hand, if we are able to solve Problem 1(2), one can obtain a family of games that have the pairs (1, 1) and (2, 2) as pure Nash equilibria.
ALGEBRAIC GEOMETRY NOTIONS
In this section, algebraic geometry notions are recalled following the exposition in Cox et al. (2015) . These concepts are used in Section 5 to compute a solution to Problem 1. 
Given an ideal I in K[x], the affine variety of I is V (I) = {x ∈ K n : p(x) = 0, ∀p ∈ I}.
Let Z 0 denote the set of all integers greater than or equal to zero. Let Z n 0 denote the set of all the n-tuples α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) such that α i ∈ Z 0 , i = 1, . . . , n. Define the set of monomials
, denoted >, is a total, well ordering relation on the set of monomials x α . The lexicographic monomial ordering (briefly, lex order ), denoted > , is defined as:
Let a monomial order on K[x] be fixed. The leading monomial of a polynomial f ∈ K[x], denoted LM(f ), is the largest monomial appearing in f , while the leading term of f , denoted LT(f ) is the term cx α , where
, a finite set G = {g 1 , . . . , g l } ⊂ I is a Groebner basis of I if LT(g 1 ), . . . , LT(g l ) = LT(I) , where LT(I) = {cx α : ∃f ∈ I such that LT(f ) = cx α }.
Let K denote the algebraic closure of K, i.e., the algebraic extension of K that is algebraically closed (for instance, R = C and C = C). By Zorn's Lemma, it can be shown that every field has an algebraic closure and that the algebraic closure of a field is unique up to an isomorphism that fixes every member of K (Atiyah and Macdonald, 1969) . Let I be an ideal in K[x] and let V K (I) ⊂ K n be defined as
Let I be an ideal in K[x]. The j-th elimination ideal of I is I j := I ∩ K[x j+1 , . . . , x n ]. The following two theorems are well known (Cox et al., 2015, Ch. 3, Thm. 2 and 3) and states the triangularization property of any Groebner basis and how a Groebner bases can be used to compute solutions to systems of polynomial equalities. Theorem 2. Let an ideal I in K[x] be given and let G be a Groebner basis of I according to the lex order with x 1 > x 2 > . . . > x n . Then, for every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, a Groebner basis G j of the j-th elimination ideal of I is + terms in which x 1 has degree striclty lower than N i , for some N i 0. Assume that there exists a partial solution (x 2 , . . . ,x n ) ∈ V (I 1 ). If (x 2 , . . . ,x n ) / ∈ V (c 1 , . . . , c s ), then there existsx 1 such that (x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n ) ∈ V (I).
MONOTONE STRICTLY INCREASING UNIVARIATE POLYNOMIALS
In this section, necessary and sufficient conditions such that an univariate polynomial p is monotone strictly increasing in a given interval are stated. These conditions are used in Section 5.2 to compute a solution to Problem 1(2). 
The polynomial p is monotone strictly increasing in [a, b] if and only if z is a sum of two squares. Corollary 1. Let the assumptions of Lemma 1 hold; p is monotone strictly increasing in [a, b] if and only if there exist 
odd, is a set of algebraic equation only in δ, . Thus, the solution to this equations is a set of algebraic constraint on δ, and a set of expressions of the parameters in κ as functions of δ, .
On the other hand, by (4), one has that the coefficient κ k in z multiplies, for k = 0, . . . , M , the term
Hence, by defining the set
where T M ij is the (i, j)-th entry of matrix T M and w i is the i-th entry of vector w, i, j = 1, . . . , M + 1. Proposition 2. If b > a, T M is invertible for any M .
By Proposition 2, a solution to the set of equalitieŝ
, that is a set of algebraic equalities in the unknowns δ, . Theorems 2 and 3 are the correct instruments to compute the solution to these inequalities. Namely, by defining ξ = [ ξ 1 · · · ξ 2M +2 ] , where ξ i = δ M +1−i , i = 1, . . . , M + 1, ξ j = 2M +2−j , j = M + 1, . . . , 2M + 2. and by letting 
+ terms in which ξ i+1 has degree striclty lower than N j , for some
It is also possible to check what solutions such that (ā i+2 , . . . ,ā 2M +2 ) ∈ V R (c i,1 , . . . , c i,li ) extend to (ā i+1 ,ā i+2 , . . . ,ā 2M +2 ) by defining the ideal J = I M + c i,1 , . . . , c i,li and by repeating such a procedure for the ideal J . Hence, lettingī be the smallest integer such that Gī = ∅, it is possible to iteratively apply this procedure backward to compute the set of all the solutions in V R (I M ). Therefore, the set of all the p ∈ R[s] of degree M that are nonnegative in [a, b] can be computed as
where V R (I M ) can be obtained with the procedure given above. Note that the set V R (I M ) ∩ R 2M +2 is nonempty, since the set {ξ ∈ R 2M +2 :
Thus, the set of all the monotone strictly increasing polynomials
Note that techniques similar to the ones presented in this section have been used in to achieve dead-beat regulation for mechanical jugglers.
COMPUTATION OF STRATEGICALLY EQUIVALENT BIMATRIX GAMES
In this section, a procedure to compute a solution to Problem 1 is given. Note that the conditions of Theorem 1 (namely, the equality relations in (2)) need to hold for n·m points (namely, the entries of matrices A G and B G ). By the Lagrange interpolation formula (Bakhvalov, 1977) , given a finite set of points P = {s 1 , . . . ,s m } (usually called sample points), there exists a polynomial p of degree lower than or equal to m − 1 such that, for any function f : R → R, p(s) = f (s),s ∈ P. In addition, lettingm m − 1 be the smallest integer such that there exists a polynomial p of degreem such that p(s) = f (s), for alls ∈ P, one has that there exists a unique polynomial p of degreem (called Lagrange form of f with respect to P) such that p(s) = f (s), for alls ∈ P. The following example shows that, even if the function f is monotone strictly increasing in an interval [a, b] , the Lagrange form of f may not be monotone on [a, b] . Example 2. Let f = 3 cos(2s) + 7s and [a, b] = [0, 3]. Function f is strictly increasing in [a, b] , because f (s) > 0, for all s in [a, b] . Consider the sample points P = {0, 1.5, 3}. The Lagrange form of f with respect to P is p = − 8 3 s 2 sin 2 3 2 cos(3) + s(4 + 4 cos(3) − cos(6)) + 3. Clearly, such a polynomial is not strictly increasing because p (s) < 0, for 0 < s < −12−12 cos(3)+3 cos (6) 4−8 cos(3)+4 cos(6) . However, by allowing higher order polynomials, we can use (8)- (9) to compute a strictly increasing polynomial q such that q(s) = f (s), for alls ∈ P. Namely, letting M = 2, one has to compute a solution to f (s) =κ 0 + 3 k=1 κ k−1 ks k , ∀s ∈ P, κ = (
inκ 0 , ξ. Note that this is a set of algebraic equalities in ξ that can be solved by using Theorems 2 and 3. A solution to this problem is given by q(s) = 1.066s 3 − 2.171s 2 + 3.878s + 3. As shown in Example 2, even if there exists a function f such thats i >s j implies f (s i ) > f (s j ), the Lagrange form of f may be not strictly increasing. However, by allowing higher order polynomials, it may be possible to compute a monotone strictly increasing polynomial p such that f (s) = p(s), for alls ∈ P, where P is a finite set of points. By this reasoning, to actually compute a solution to Problem 1, we will consider only polynomial functions.
Strongly strategically equivalent games
Let a bimatrix game G, identified by m × n matrices A
